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A CRITIQUE OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL
LEAGUE'S "BLACKOUT" EXEMPTION
FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS
INTRODUCTION
The National Football League (NFL) enjoys two exemptions from
the sanctions of the Sherman Act.' The first exemption, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1291,2 authorizes agreements between the NFL and television net-
works whereby the League pools and sells television rights as a single
package. The second exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 1292,' permits the black-
out of outside game telecasts in the home territory when the home club
is playing at home. As implemented today, it also permits the blackout
of home games in the home territory.
4
This note will show that reasons given by the Supreme Court in
1953,1 to permit "outside game blackouts," and by Congress in 1961, to
support the section 1292 statutory exemption, are no longer available to
the NFL in 1980. The League has misinterpreted the scope of the 1953
decree in United States v. NFL (NFL I)6 and the exception clause in
section 1291. This misinterpretation, combined with problems in defi-
nition and administration inherent in the statute, call for judicial re-
view and legislative reform. Section 1292 should be repealed or
amended to limit the NFL's power to administer what is presently a
broadly defined blackout exemption.
This note first addresses problems in definition and administration
in the language of section 1292.' Second, the judicial decisions behind
1. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The relevant text reads: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
2. Professional Football, etc., Leagues-Television Contracts Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) ex-
empts from antitrust consequences "any joint agreement by or among persons engaged in or
conducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or hock-
ey, by which any league of clubs participating in professional football, baseball, basketball,
or hockey contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league's
member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or
hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs."
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976) is the "[a]rea telecasting restriction limitation" popularly known as
the "blackout exemption." It removes the antitrust exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 1291, for agree-
ments prohibiting the telecasting of games in any area, "except within the home territory of a
member club of the league on a day when such club is playing a game at home."
4. The outside game blackout occurs when a game, in which neither team is the home team, is
blacked-out in the home territory when the home team is at home. Thus, the outside game
between the Chicago Bears and Detroit Lions is blacked-out in New York, the home terri-
tory of the Giants, whenever they are playing at home. The home game blackout results in
the blackout of the local Giants game in New York. The combination of an outside game
blackout and a home game blackout coerces stadium attendance, and when the home team is
at home, it prevents the telecast of any team in the home territory.
5. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) [hereinafter cited as NFL I].
6. Id.
7. See notes 18-27 infra, and accompanying text.
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the enactment of the blackout exemption are reviewed.8 Third, the leg-
islative rationale for the exemptions is discussed.9 Finally, an under-
standing of section 1292 and the 1953 decision in United States v.
NFL '0 requires reference to a later Supreme Court decision of the
same name, NFL II, and to a Congressional enactment which followed
the decision in NFL II, 15 U.S.C. § 1291."
The League has misconstrued section 1291 as giving the League an
indiscriminate right to blackout any game it desires. Congress did not
intend to grant such power. Section 1292 was enacted to lift the exemp-
tion from antitrust laws, which had been read into section 1291, with
one exception: the blackout of a home game within the home territory
when a member club is playing at home. ' 2 Congress did not intend the
exemption to cover "home game blackouts."' 3 In employing such a
blackout, the League has exceeded the permissable limits of the excep-
tion.
The second half of this note focuses both on the reasons why the
economic protection afforded by the blackout is no longer required'4
and on the erosion of the statute's exemption which has already oc-
curred.' 5 The League's arguments for the blackout are contrasted with
the public's interest in home game telecasts.' 6 Finally, solutions are
proposed which will ensure financial stability for interested parties in
the event that the home game blackout is lifted.'7 Pay-cable television
offers a potential solution capable of circumventing the home game
blackout. Subscribers to cable television provide the revenue upon
which cable systems may draw to bid competitively for the television
rights to home game blackouts.
8. NFL 1, 116 F. Supp. 319; United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as NFL III. The companion cases, NFL I and NFL II, decided in 1953 and 1961
respectively, addressed the antitrust implications of the League's television practices. Al-
though the 1953 decision found many television and radio policies in violation of the anti-
trust laws, the blackout of outside games was held to be reasonable restraint on trade. The
1961 decision struck down a pooled television rights contract between the League and CBS
as being in violation of the earlier 1953 decree.
9. See notes 46-57 infra and accompanying text.
10. NFL 1, 116 F. Supp. 319.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 supplants the 1961 decision. The section immunizes from antitrust attack
any joint agreement by the NFL to transfer all or part of the rights of its member clubs in the
telecasting of games. It was enacted to permit the execution of the pooled television rights
contract, found illegal in NFL II. 107 CONG. REC. 20059 (1961).
12. See notes 53-57 infra and accompanying text.
13. Sobel, Television Sports Blackouts: Private Rights v. Public Policy, 48 L.A.B. BULL. 169, 173
(1973).
14. See notes 58-63 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 64-70 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 71-80 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 81-90 infra and accompanying text.
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DEFINITIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS REQUIRING
REFORM OF SECTION 1292
Definition of "Home Territory"
Section 1292 permits "home territory" blackouts when a team is
playing at home. The statute does not state which games may be
blacked-out. In addition, it does not define home territory. Confused
administration of the statutory provision has resulted. The NFL has
interpreted the provision to permit the blackout of both a home game
and an outside game. 8 The legislative history of section 1292 shows
that the statute was enacted to preserve the 1953 decision in NFL I,
applicable only to outside games.' 9
The geographic bounds of the "home territory" are similarly ill-
defined. The 1953 NFL Constitution and By-laws 20 defined "home ter-
ritory" as that territory within 75 miles of the "League City."'" The
stadium site was treated as the measuring point. Under the present
constitution "home territory" includes "the surrounding territory to the
extent of 75 miles in every direction from the exterior corporate lim-
its.",22
The Nature of the Blackout
A third construction problem arises in interpreting the nature of the
blackout permitted. One interpretation may allow a blackout of the
reception of the game within the home territory (reception blackout).23
A second interpretation permits a blackout of the telecast of a game
within the home territory (telecast blackout).24
Reception Blackout. Under a reception blackout no game signals can
be received within the home territory. Unfortunately, some viewers
just outside of the blacked-out territory are also affected. This infringe-
ment is caused by the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC)
prohibition on "fuzz-outs." In Lee Enterprises, Inc., an Iowa affiliate of
CBS just outside of the home territory telecast the Vikings-Packer
game.2 1 It reduced its broadcast power twenty percent, so that the sig-
nal could not be received in the blacked-out Minneapolis home terri-
tory. The FCC ruled this reduction of power, or fuzz-out, to be in
violation of FCC rules.
18. P. Rozelle, Answers to Questions About The National Football League's TV Policy (Feb.
1973) (available upon request from the Broadcasting Office of the National Football League,
New York, New York) [hereinafter cited as NFL TV Policy].
19. NFL 1, 116 F. Supp. 319; see also note 13 supra.
20. NFL CONST. art. X (1953).
21. NFL CONST. art. X (1953).
22. NFL CONST. arts. IV & X (1976).
23. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 887 (1971); see also Torrens, Professional Football Tele-
casts and the Blackout Privilege, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 304-05 (1972).
24. Id.
25. 27 F.C.C.2d 887 (1971).
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A reception blackout deprives a fan of the opportunity to watch on
television a game played at a stadium too distant for him to attend.
Because out-of-town fans are not members of the "potential ticket buy-
ing market" residing in the home territory, broadcasting a game for
their benefit will not cause a reduction in gate receipts.
If section 1292 is interpreted to permit a reception blackout, the
statute is overly broad. It infringes on the public's right to enjoy the
widest dissemination of interstate telecasts of professional sports events
available under the Sherman26 and Communication Acts.27
Telecast Blackout. The alternative construction of section 1292 is the
telecast blackout, and its application also creates problems. Such a
blackout frustrates the statute's purpose. It enables a network affiliate
just outside the home territory to telecast the game to prospective ticket
buyers in the blacked-out area. Thus, the non-home territory affiliate
achieves the result that is prohibited to an affiliate within the area.
A Congressional "Hands-Off" Policy Giving the NFL the Freedom to Define
Its Own Exemptions
Traditionally, federal agencies have been empowered to regulate
economic enterprises which are beneficiaries of an antitrust exemp-
tion.28 These enterprises are usually characterized by unique circum-
stances which affect the economic sector, a factor absent with respect to
the NFL. The economic circumstances of the NFL are not unique, for
they include the interest in maximizing profits by ensuring stadium at-
tendance. Yet, the NFL has been given almost blanket authority to
regulate itself.29 The unique combination of antitrust exemptions and
minimum federal regulation applicable to the NFL illustrates Con-
gress's hands-off policy in dealing with professional football. Congress
fears that its intervention in League practices will impair "public confi-
dence in the honesty of sports contests."3
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
27. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943): The public interest to be served by regula-
tion is "the interest in the listening public in 'the larger and more effective use of radio.' "
(quoting Communications Act of 1934 47 U.S.C. § 151, § 3 03(g)). If the larger and more
effective use of the airwaves is to be pursued, it is necessary to prevent the mandatory impo-
sition of programming and the discretionary withholding of programming otherwise com-
mitted to the public airways.
28. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824h (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). Electric utility companies engaged in
interstate commerce are regulated by the Federal Power Commission (FPC). In 1977 the
FPC was terminated and its functions were transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission under 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(a)(l)(B), 7293 (1976).
29. The NFL's power as sole administrator of the blackout is an especially acute problem. The
greater the restriction on home game telecasts, the more the League gains in ticket sales and
stadium attendance.
30. The social value of sports has been judicially noticed. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797
(S.D.N.Y.'1970); S. REP. No. 462, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 14 (1965). It would seem that the
government may not regulate the blackout exemption because of the desire to avoid the
appearance of intervention in professional sports. Lotter, Keeping The Illusion Alive: Public
Interest in Professional Sports, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 48 passim (1978).
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CASE HISTORY BEHIND THE BLACKOUT
United States v. NFL 's Analysis of the Antitrust Aspects
of the Home Territory Blackout
The outside game blackout has been found to be a reasonable re-
straint of trade, not in violation of the Sherman Act. In NFL J,31 the
Justice Department alleged that Article X of the NFL Constitution
32
consituted a contract between League members restraining interstate
trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The Department argued that the
blackout is a horizontal agreement to allocate market territories: an
agreement among competing clubs of the NFL to restrict the projection
of an outside game or home game into the home territory of a team
when that team is playing at home. The agreement to restrict projec-
tion of televised games is a restraint of trade. It cuts off a potential
market, television viewers in the home territory. Without the blackout
a club could compete in the sale of television rights to its games, as well
as in the sale of tickets to those attending.
33
It can also be argued that the blackout is a vertical agreement be-
tween a seller (the NFL) and a buyer (the network) to restrict the terri-
tory in which the buyer may televise the outside and home game. The
NFL is selling its product, the games, to an independent distributor, the
television network. The NFL reserves the exclusive right to sell that
product within the home territory. The distributor is prohibited from
televising in the blacked-out home territory.34
In analyzing the antitrust implications of the outside game black-
out, the NFL I court stated, "[t]here can be little doubt that [this] provi-
sion constitute[s] a contract in restraint of trade."3  The court
concluded that the "purpose and effect" of the provision was a "clear
case of allocating market territories among competitors, . . a practice
generally held illegal under the antitrust laws."36 The court, however,
declined to apply a per se rule.
31. 116 F. Supp. 319.
32. NFL CONST. art. X (1953). Article X of the NFL Constitution gives each team the exclusive
ight to provide live or televised football to the residents of its own home territory. Under
article X, Team A was not permitted to broadcast any of its games within 75 miles of Team
B's home territory, when Team B was either playing at home or televising its game back to
its home city. As a result, each club had a monopoly on football telecasts in their respective
home territories.
33. See note 1 supra.
34. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 322; see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972); United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Continental TV, Inc. v. G.T.E.
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
35. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 322.
36. Id. The court reasoned that when a team agrees to prohibit the projection of its game in the
home cities of other teams, it cuts off part of its potential market. In exchange for not com-
peting for other team's television audiences, each team receives an exclusive television mar-
et in its home territory free from competition from other clubs.
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United States v. NFL 's Analysis of the Outside Game
Blackout as Reasonable
Although the NFL I court conceded that the outside game blackout
is a restraint of trade, it declined to apply aper se rule, relying instead
on the rule of reason analysis enunciated in Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States .3 Under the Chicago Board of Trade analysis, the "true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed . . . merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it. . .may sup-
press or even destroy competition. 38 Thus, the question before the
court in 1953 concerned the reasonableness of the restriction preventing
the telecast of outside games in the home territory of other teams on
days when those teams were playing at home. If the restriction was
found to be reasonable, it would be legal notwithstanding its restraint
on trade.39
Judge Grim's decision characterized the NFL as a joint venture in
accordance with Appalachian Coals v. United States.' ° Under Appa-
lachian Coals, a horizontal market division agreement central to a joint
venture is an exception to theper se prohibition and is examined under
a rule of reason analysis. The court recognized that if clubs were to
compete with each other in the traditional business fashion, the
stronger teams would soon drive the weaker ones into financial ruin.
This fact alone would not justify an exception for the blackout. How-
ever, the court determined that without the blackout the demise of the
entire league would result, eliminating competition altogether. Apply-
ing the rule of reason, the court found that on balance, the home terri-
tory blackout of outside games would benefit competition.4' For
example, the outside game blackout eliminates competition between
the home team which seeks a sell-out crowd and the network telecast-
ing that team's games. This ensures tickets sales for the home game,
producing revenue from ticket sales, concessions and parking.
The NFL I court reasoned that financial strength obtained through
ensured gate revenue would upgrade the quality of professional foot-
ball. This revenue would be used to obtain better players and coaches
and to improve training programs. Financial strength would generate
physical strength and increase competition among all clubs. 2
The court's conclusion in 1953 that the outside game blackout was
reasonable was supported by the NFL's unique economic circum-
stances and fledging status at that time. In the first three decades of the
37. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 322-23.
38. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
39. NFL , 116 F. Supp. at 323.
40. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
41. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 325.
42. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 323; see also 107 CONG. REC. 20662 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961
CONG. REC.].
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League's existence, forty-one franchises failed.43 The evidence in NFL
I revealed that less than half of the clubs in the early years of the
League would be financially successful without a guarantee of gate rev-
enue.
44
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND THE ENACTMENT OF THE
BLACKOUT EXEMPTION
United States P. NFL II and the Pooled Television Rights Exemption
under Section 1291
Judge Grim's court was given the opportunity to take a second look
at the NFL's television practices in NFL 11. 41 In 1961 the NFL made
an agreement with CBS, granting the network exclusive rights to tele-
vise a package of League games for two years and permitting the net-
work to decide which games would be televised.46 The fourteen
member clubs, the individual clubs, and the League agreed, under the
contract, to pool their television rights and sell them as a package to the
purchasing network. Each club would receive an equal share in the
proceeds.
Fearing that the CBS contract would violate the earlier 1953 decree,
the NFL petitioned Judge Grim's court for a construction of his earlier
decree. In NFL II, the court struck down the CBS contract, ruling that
the agreement violated the Sherman Act. By pooling their television
rights, the clubs were in effect contracting to eliminate competition
among themselves in the sale of television rights to their games.
Congress's Action to "Rescue" the NFL
The decision caused an uproar among angry football fans. Amidst
widespread anxiety that there would be no televised professional foot-
ball in the fall of 1961, Congress moved quickly to extend legislative
relief to the NFL and its fans.47 It enacted section 1292 which super-
seded the 1961 decision by permitting the League to pool the individual
club's television rights.48
43. TV Hearings: Hearings on HR. 8757 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. on the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1961) [hereinafter cited as TV Hearings].
44. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 323-25; see also 1961 CONG. REC. 20059-63, 20662.
45. 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961); id. Judge Grim retained jurisdiction by a provision in the
judgment decree of the 1953 decisions for the purpose of enabling the parties to petition for a
construction of the final decree.
46. Id.
47. H.R. REP. 9096, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The antitrust exemptions were passed by the
House on September 18th. 1961 CONG. REC. at 20064. The exemptions passed the Senate on
September 21st, 1961 CONG. REC. at 20662; they were signed into law on September 30th.
1961 CONG. REC. at 21552.
The anxiety among fans was unnecessary. Prior to the disapproval of the pooled CBS
contract, the League had individually negotiated contracts providing for telecasts of the 1961
season. 1961 CONG. REC. at 15223.
48. TV Hearings, supra note 44, at 28; 1961 CONG. REC. at 20059, indicating that 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1291-1292 were needed to supersede the decision of Judge Grim issued July, 1961 in NFL
HI.
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Congress justified the pooled-television-rights exemption by relying
on the rationale applied by Judge Grim in NFL 1.49 Curiously, Con-
gress used the 1953 rationale, in effect, to reverse the 1961 case, NFL
II. Congressional purpose was clear. The elimination of competition
among the clubs was justifiable as a financial necessity.
The purpose of this bill is to permit professional sports leagues to deal
jointly in the sale of their television rights and, by grouping their
weaker and stronger clubs and those clubs with greater or lesser home
territory population, to provide equal access to television facilities and
television income for all member clubs of their league.
50
The Reason Why Section 1292 Does Not Protect the Home Game
Blackout from Antitrust Laws
The 86th Congress passed section 1292 in the wake of NFL II and
the ensuing statutory antitrust exemption given the League's television
agreements by section 1291.51 Drafting section 1291 broadly to exempt
agreements by which professional teams sell rights to telecast games,
Congress unintentionally imbued the NFL with the power to blackout
any game it desired. This power extended to home territory blackouts
when the team was playing at home.5
2
Section 1292 prohibits all blackouts excluding those within the
home territory of a club playing at home. Thus, the so-called blackout
exemption in section 1292 was enacted for the purpose of prohibiting
most blackouts.53 The exception clause, which allows blackouts within
the home territory of a member club playing at home, was enacted for
the limited purpose of preserving the NFL I decision.54 The home
game blackout was not an issue before the NFL I court, and Judge
Grim did not address or rule upon its legality. Thus, to the extent sec-
tion 1292 codifies the 1953 decree, it does not extend antitrust protec-
tion to the home game blackout.
In view of the judicial and legislative history, the correct interpreta-
tion of the statute would recognize the League's authority only to
blackout outside games in the home territory. As such, the practice of
blacking-out home games in the home territory exceeds the scope of the
49. NFL I exempted the outside game blackout in recognition of the substantial interest the
public has in viewing professional football contests. The exemption was intended to place
the individual clubs in comparable financial positions. 1961 CONG. REC. at 20059-63.
50. 1961 CONG. REC. at 20059; TVHearings, supra note 44, at 4-5.
51. The Antitrust Subcommittee feared that standing alone the exemption would grant "to the
sports involved unchecked power to deprive the American public of the right to see over TV
any sports contest." TVHearings, supra note 44, at 29. The committee went on to say that
they did not want to "give [the NFL] carte blanche to blackout at any time." Id. at 30.
52. Id.
53. The Antitrust Subcommittee felt that the adoption of section 1292 as an amendment to sec-
tion 1291 would "completely nullify the (1953) decision of Judge Grim." TV Hearings,
supra note 44, at 29. The blackout amendment was proposed with the intent that only those
blackouts sanctioned by Judge Grim would be exempt. Id. at 28. See also H.R. REP. No.
i178, 87th Cong., ist Sess. 5 (1961).
54. TV Hearings, supra note 44, at 28.
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exemption."
THE ECONOMIC PROTECTION OF THE BLACKOUT NO
LONGER NECESSARY
The outside game blackout was reasonable in 1953 because it pro-
vided financial stability essential to the survival of the weaker teams.56
However, three decades later, the NFL has emerged as a thriving busi-
ness, and special treatment under antitrust laws is no longer warranted.
The strength of the League can be measured by the growth in several
areas.
The League has increased the number of its member clubs. It has
grown from the twelve teams in 1953 to the present roster of twenty-
eight with the American Football Conference and National Football
Conference sharing equally. 57
The number of games played each season has increased. In 1953
the NFL teams played a twelve-game season. The eight AFL teams
played a fourteen-game schedule in their first season in 1960. Cur-
rently, sixteen regular-season and four preseason games are played.
The number of post-season games has also increased,58 with the addi-
55. Another blackout not entitled to protection under § 1292 is the championship game black-
out. In Blaich v. NFL, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), ticketless fans sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to force the NFL to lift the blackout of the soldout New York Giants - Green
Bay Packers championship game. The plaintiffs challenged the blackout, arguing that sec-
tion 1292 was designed to meet the problems created by the 1961 ruling that concerned only
regular season games. The court denied the injunction.
In refusing to ban the blackout of the championship game, the Blaich court went beyond
the 1953 ruling which applied only to "games" defined to be "regular season games." The
judgment entered by Judge Grim back in 1953 specifically stated in II(e) that "the term
,games' meant regular season and exhibition profesional football games, not including con-
ference playoff games or the 'World Professional Championship Game."' TV Hearings,
supra note 44, at 24.
I Additional arguments for excluding championship games from the blackout privilege is
found in Int'l Boxing Club v. United States, 348 U.S. 236 (1955). In defining a relevant
product market the court ruled that championship sporting events constitute an entirely dif-
ferent market than ordinary events within the same sport.
56. An exception to the various antitrust provisions is carved out for "new entrants." In United
States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), arf'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567
(1960), the court first recognized the new entrant defense to the antitrust laws. But as the
industry takes root and grows the newcomer defense is lost and the industry's practices are
subject to antitrust attack. See also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), where the court denied the new business defense II
years after defendant first entered the market.
57. In 1953 the NFL was composed of 12 clubs: Baltimore Colts, Chicago Bears, Cleveland
Browns, Detroit Lions, Green Bay Packers, Los Angeles Rams, New York Giants, Philadel-
phia Eagles, Pittsburgh Steelers, St. Louis Cardinals, San Francisco Forty-Niners, and
Washington Redskins. The Dallas Cowboys were added in 1960, and the Minnesota Vik-
ings, in 1961. In 1959 the American Football League (AFL) was founded and added eight
more professional teams: Boston Patriots (now New England Patriots), Buffalo Bills, Dallas
Texans (now Kansas City Chiefs), Denver Broncos, Houston Oilers, New York Jets, Oak-
land Raiders, and San Diego Chargers. Four more clubs were added after 1966: Atlanta
Falcons, Cincinnati Bengals, Miami Dolphins, and New Orleans Saints. The recent entrance
by the Seattle Seahawks (NFC) and Tampa Bay Buccaneers (AFC) increases the NFL roster
to 28 teams. NFL CONST. art. IV, § 4.4 (1976); H. CLASSEN, THE HISTORY OF PROFES-
SIONAL FOOTBALL 480-83, 503 (1963).
58. In 1970 the NFL reorganized the League into two conferences with three divisions each
"Blackout" Exemption
tion of the Super Bowl and Pro Bowl.
Regular and playoff game attendance has continued to rise. In 1960
total attendance was four million, in 1965, six and one-half million, and
in 1970, ten million. The League posted a record number of fans at-
tending the 1979 season games, thirteen million.59
In addition, the price tag for the television rights contract has in-
creased substantially. In 1970 a four-year contract with the three major
networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) amounted to annual income of thirty-
five and one-half million dollars. Under the four-year contract negoti-
ated in 1977, each of the twenty-eight teams receive five million dollars
annually.60
Faced with this evidence and with recommendations for the repeal
of section 1292, proponents argue that clubs have a private right to
maximize ticket sales by blacking-out home games. 6' The blackout has
outlived its limited purpose of ensuring ticket sales for a fledging
league. In 1980 the viability of the NFL is not in jeopardy and does
not merit a special blackout exemption. Clubs no longer earmark tick-
et sales for survival income, as clubs did in 1953. The section 1292
exemption cannot be justified in this situation. Established, viable pri-
vately owned clubs should not be assisted in "profit maximization" by
protective government regulation that distorts the competitive process
of the market place.
EROSION OF THE EXEMPTION
Modified Lifting of the Blackout: Outside Game Telecasts
Erosion in the exercise of the blackout exemption has minimized
(Eastern, Central and Western). Four teams from each conference enter the playoffs. Two
wild-card playoffs, four divisional, and two conference championship games constitute the
post-season schedule. See CLASSEN, supra note 57, at 480-83.
59. Attendance figures:
Professional Football Attendance
League 1960 1965 1970+ 1979
AFL 958,000 1,812,000
NFL 3,195,000 4,685,000 9,913,000 13,182,039
Total* 4,153,000 6,597,000 9,913,000 13,182,039
+ AFL-NFL merger was effected in 1969
* Does not include exhibition games
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1971, at 201 (1971); id. 1968, at 207 (1968); id. 1961, at 196 (1961); see Torrens, supra note
23, at 310 n.61.
60. Television revenue constitutes about 37 percent of an NFL team's annual gross income.
NFL TV Policy, supra note 18, at 5; P. Rozelle, NFL/TV History 10 (1979) (available
through the Broadcasting Office of the National Football League, New York, New York)
[hereinafter cited as NFL/TV History].
61. NFL/TV History, supra note 60, at 8. Hearings On The 48 Hour Sellout Exception. Hearings
on S. 4007 and S. 4010 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 83, 89 & 130 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sellout Hear-
ings].
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application of the blackout and weakened NFL arguments for contin-
ued protection from the antitrust laws. In 1966 the NFL lifted the
outside game blackout permitted by NFL I.62 The League had voiced
concern that outside game telecasts would result in a decrease in ticket
sales. The lifting of the blackout revealed that this prediction was un-
founded. Five years after the first such telecasts, attendance at home
games had not diminished. In 1971 ninety-five percent of all seats in
NFL stadiums were sold.63
The Local Telecast of Super Bowl VII
In 1972 the 92d Congress considered another modification of the
blackout, a bill requiring the local telecast of any home game sold out
forty-eight hours before game-time. 4 With this legislative gun pointed
at him and in the face of mounting public presure,65 NFL Commis-
sioner Pete Rozelle announced that local television coverage of Super
Bowl VII would be allowed in the event of a ten-day advance sellout.66
The Sellout Exception
Following the 1973 Super Bowl telecast, a third legislative wedge
was driven into the blackout exemption. For the 1973 and 1974 sea-
sons, an experimental two-year law prohibited the blackout of any
game sold out seventy-two hours prior to kickoff.67 The law expired in
1975, but the NFL continues to abide by the sellout exception. This is
a remarkable change in League policy, considering the Commissioner's
vehement statements to the 92d Congress denouncing local telecasting
of soldout home games.68
THE LEAGUE'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE BLACKOUT VERSUS THE
PUBLIC'S INTEREST IN HOME GAME TELECASTS
Ticket Sales and No-Shows
The battle to televise a soldout game within the home city was not
won easily. In appearances before the Congress in 1972, Rozelle ar-
62. NFL/TV History, supra note 60, at 5; NFL TV Policy, supra note 18, at 2.
63. Shooshan, Confrontation with Congress- Professional Sports and the Television Anti Blackout
Law, 25 SYRACuSE L. REV. 719 (1974).
64. In 1972, Senators John Pastore (D. R.I.), William Proxmire (D. Wis.), and Robert Griffin (R.
Mich.) introduced S. 4010, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972) that would have required the local
telecast of any home game which was soldout 48 hours in advance.
65. In the past the NFL has repeatedly refused to permit the telecasting of championship games,
even in the event of a sellout. Rubin v. Reese, Civ. No. 70-1489 Civ. T.C. (S.D. Fla. 1970);
other attempts to ban the blackout include Rubin v. NFL, Civ. No. 70-22897 (Dade County,
Fla. Cir. Ct. 1970); Kretschmar v. NFL, Civ. No. 710342 (Broward County, Fla. Cir. Ct.
1971). Ellis Rubin filed the state and federal actions. The federal court held that he lacked
standing to sue. However, state circuit court Judge Franza, although powerless to lift the
blackout, held the blackout to be a clear violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
66. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1971, § 5 at 3, col. i.
67. Pub. L. No. 93-107 § 1, 87 Stat. 350 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 331(d) (expired 1975)).
68. S. REP. No. 347, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1973).
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gued that future game attendance would suffer if local telecasts were
allowed. He reasoned that home-team fans, accustomed to watching a
soldout game on local television free of charge, would not pay to watch
games from a stadium seat.69
The Commissioner further asserted that the blackout would guard
"no-shows," those fans who buy tickets but elect to remain at home
because of weather conditions, team standings, relative quality of op-
ponents, or other personal reasons. The League feared that telecast of
soldout games would result in football's demise into a video sport with
teams playing to empty, albeit "soldout" stadiums.7" The modifications
permitting the outside game telecasts in the home territory when the
home club is at home and permitting the local telecast of a home game
soldout forty-eight hours in advance, however, have not had an adverse
effect on either ticket sales or stadium attendance. 7 FCC studies72 and
an independent study by Vanderbilt University73 indicate that the local
televising of home games does not affect stadium attendance. The FCC
study, conducted pursuant to the 1973 experimental law, revealed a
miniscule seven-tenths of one percent increase in the number of no-
shows at televised home games.74
Stadium Attendance at Televised Home Games
The FCC and Vanderbilt findings can perhaps be attributed to the
fan's desire to attend the game rather than watch the event on televi-
sion. Fans will not forfeit the opportunity to attend a professional foot-
ball game for a multitude of reasons, ranging from pre-game festivities
to the excitement of cheering after a touchdown. 75 The hometown fan
has a limited opportunity to watch his team play at the local stadium.
He is likely to attend the home game despite simultaneous local telecast
of the contest.
During the sixteen-week season, fans can watch five televised
games. There are three Sunday telecasts (the CBS and NBC
"doubleheaders"), one Monday Night telecast (ABC), and late-season
Thanksgiving, Thursday, and Saturday games (CBS and NBC). This
plethora of televised football games76 makes stadium attendance at the
eight home games all the more appealing to the home town fan.
The NFL erroneously cites the success of televised football to jus-
tify continuance of the home game blackout. A December 1971 study
69. H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
70. Sellout Hearings, supra note 61.
71. See note 69 supra and notes 64-68 infra.
72. See note 69 supra. FCC, FED. COMM. REP., THE SPORTS ANTI-BLACK-OUT ISSUE (Ist rep.
1974) (report done pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 331(d)). See note 69 supra.
73. H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); see Peterson, Blackouts and the Public
Interest: An Equitable Proposal, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 143-68 (1978).
74. See note 72 supra.
75. Torrens, note 23 supra, at 300 n.18.
76. NFL/TV History, supra note 60.
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indicates that seventy-one percent of the public believes that the
amount of professional football games televised is "about right."" The
survey, however, is inherently deceptive. It measures only the quantity
of telecasts available. It does not distinguish between the total of all
games televised and the limited number of home games telecasts. Dur-
ing the season, the average home territory receives approximately sev-
enty-four free NFL game telecasts. A home team's game is not
televised in the home territory, unless it is an away-game (a maximum
of eight telecasts) or a game sold-out forty-eight hours before game-
time. 78 The repeal of the blackout does not call for more telecasts.
Rather, it answers the hometown demand to see the local team's game
on television. It is an attempt to withdraw the restriction on a local
telecast which would be permitted except for section 1292.
A SOLUTION TO THE MUNICIPALITY'S FEAR OF DECREASED
GATE RECEIPTS
Representatives of professional sports7 9 argue that a home game
blackout is reasonable in light of municipal reliance on gate receipts.
League cities own the majority of stadiums and would feel the financial
crunch resulting from a decrease in stadium rentals, most of which are
based on a percentage of gross admission receipts."0 The League points
to the additional loss of parking and concession revenues that would
result from the blackout's repeal.
These contentions do not provide sufficient justification for home
game blackouts. First, the estimated decrease in revenues for munici-
palities due to local home game telecasts is speculative. 8 Second, if
additional deficits were to arise, the municipality could be compensated
with a share in the additional television revenue. The municipality
77. Lou Harris study surveying 1,991 households (Dec. 1971):
Amount of Pro Football on TV
Total Fans Men Women
Too much 21% 17% 27%
Too little 7 9 5
About right 71 73 67
Not sure I I I
See note 61 supra (also available from the Broadcasting Office of the National Football
League).
78. NFL/TV History, supra note 60.
79. Present with Commissioner Rozelle at the Oct. 4, 1972 Sellout Hearings before the Senate
Communications Subcommittee were Art Rooney, President of the Pittsburgh Steelers, Ger-
ald Phipps, Chairman of the Denver Broncos, and Jim Finks, Vice President and General
Manager of the Minnesota Vikings.
80. Some municipalities raise tonstruction funds through bonds to be repaid from stadium rent-
als and guaranteed by the local government. Operating costs are paid from stadium rentals
but deficits are met with local taxes. Local police direct traffic and provide security at the
expense of the city taxpayers. Furthermore, local taxes are usually sales and property taxes
and are regressive, placing the deficit burden on the poor, those very people that are hurt the
most by the blacking-out of home games.
81. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
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could achieve this by directly contracting for it or by indirectly recoup-
ing the loss through a rental increase.
In the event of a rental increase, the club could then elect to pay
either through television revenue or through a raise in ticket prices.
The rent transfers the true economic cost of promoting a live profes-
sional football game to tho~e who benefit most. A tax increase, there-
fore, offers another solution for the League city. Local residents may
elect to pay an additional tax for the opportunity to view televised
home games.
PAY CABLE TELEVISION'S ANSWER TO THE BLACKOUT
The Economics
The movement to lift the blackout may be answered affirmatively
by pay cable television. 2 For example, if the Chicago Bears are play-
ing at home and the game is not soldout within forty-eight hours of
kickoff, it will be blacked-out both in Chicago and in the home terri-
tory within seventy-five miles of the corporate limits of the city. The
Bears game is not blacked-out in Indianapolis, clearly outside the home
territory. The Indianapolis telecast will have a negligible effect on gate
revenue, since it is outside of the Bears ticket-buying market. The
Bears can generate television revenue, while maintaining optimum gate
attendance by selling the home game to pay cable 83 or extracting fair
compensation from Chicago cable stations importing the Indianapolis
signals carrying the game. 4
82. Cable television, also known as CATV, originated around 1950 and for the first decade was
primarily used as a means of importing broadcast signals to communities where reception
was poor or nonexistent. Cable television systems receive the signals of telecasting stations,
amplify them, transmit them by cable, and distribute them by wire to the receivers of their
subscribers.
Pay cable provides programming to viewers via cable at a per-program or pre-channel
charge. This charge is in addition to the monthly fee for Basic cable service. For general
background on the regulatory history and development of cable television, see F. BERNER,
CONSTRAINTS ON THE REGULATORY PROCESS, (1976); see also Siedlecki, SporisAnti-Siphon-
ing Rules For Pay Cable Television: A Public Right to Free TV?, 57 IND. L.J. 821 (1978).
83. Pay cable's potential market power may enable it to outbid conventional television for the
right to telecast the home game locally. The hometown subscribers may be willing to pay
more than an advertiser on conventional television for the right to see the game, permitting
cable to outbid the local network affiliate. For example, free television currently pays
$800,000 for a network showing of a movie. If five percent of 30 million cable subscribers
(one and one-half million) are willing to pay one dollar or 19% paying $.50 or 20% paying
$.25, then cable can generate the funds necessary to outbid free television. P. MACAVOY,
DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION 150-51, 155 (1977). For a chronology of cable
growth since 1950, see D. LE Duc, CABLE TV AND THE FCC (1973); K. PENCHOS, THE
OUTLOOK FOR CABLE TELEVISION (1975).
84. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976), mandates compulsory licenses for secondary trans-
mission. Section 102 extends the copyright privilege to live telecasts that are simultaneously
recorded. The copyright owner of live sports events is no longer forced to rely on the com-
mon law rather than statutory rights in proceeding against an infringing user of the live
professional football game. Thus, cable television cannot circumvent a home game blackout
y importing signals from non-home territory stations without being subject to the Act re-
quirement of fair compensation. Prior to the revised Act in 1976, cable could make secon-
dary transmissions without any copyright liability. See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415
Journal of Legislation
Local advertisers will find the cable audience especially desirable
because of the selectivity of the hometown audience; a new, indirect
source of revenue for the team will result.85 The system has disadvan-
tages. When the signal from Indianapolis is imported to Chicago, it
will generate competition with other regional and national games tele-
vised over the networks. This will fractionalize the audience for local
football telecasts. For example, Chicago viewers may watch the Bears
on cable, the Detroit Lions on CBS, or the Dallas Cowboys on NBC.
As a result, the networks cannot guarantee their advertisers as large an
audience, for they must now compete with the home game on cable.
The NFL television package becomes less attractive to the networks,
and they will recoup their losses in advertising revenue by lowering
their bids for the League's television package. Nevertheless, the NFL's
total revenue from televised football will not be affected. The decrease
in revenue from the sale of limited television rights to the networks can
be fairly compensated with sales to cable systems. The newly acquired
contract with the cable company for the rights to the heretofore
blacked-out game will contribute to the League's total profits.
86
Local Cable Telecasts of Home Games and the Communications Act
Natural competition between the cable and conventional systems
for both the football audience and television rights achieves the policy
behind the Communications Act.8 7 This statute was enacted in 1934 to
regulate the public airwaves, including television, radio and cable, in
the public interest."8 The concept of using the public airways in the
public interest emerged as early as 1924. In that year Herbert Hoover
testified:
Radio communication is not to be considered merely a business carried
on for private gain, for private advertisement, or for entertainment of
the curious. It is a public concern impressed with the public trust and
to be considered primarily from the standpoint of public interest to the
same extent and upon the basis of the same general principles as our
U.S. 394 (1974), holding that CATV's importation of distant signals of conventional televi-
sion broadcast was not "performing" and not liable for copyright infringement.
85. In purchasing advertising time during a home game telecast, the local car dealer will receive
an exclusively local audience representing the limited and select market he desires. It is the
hometown fans who are likely to purchase a car, not the viewers of a national game in
another city or state. What the national advertiser views as a detriment, a concentrated local
audience, the local advertiser welcomes. In purchasing commercial time during the home
game, the local advertiser does not "waste" his advertising dollar upon an overly broad na-
tional audience.
86. Id.
87. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976) empowers the FCC to regulate television
and radio, including cable television, when it is reasonably ancillary to the effective perform-
ance of the FCC's responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 99 S. Ct. 1435 (1979); United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). See note 27 supra.
88. Fair compensation for secondary transmission is required, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) mandates
compulsory licenses for secondary transmissions, as does the new copyright law, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 102, 501 (1976). See note 86 supra for a discussion of the copyright requirements.
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other public utilities. 89
Regulation and judicial construction have developed the concept of
public interest into a policy geared toward protection of the airwaves
by preventing manipulation and control by private interests.9" The
home game blackout violates the public interest. It is the discretionary
restraint of programming by the NFL to ensure ticket sales and sta-
dium attendance. Although the Communications Act does not give the
public the right to demand the telecasting of any program, the public
does have a right to prevent manipulation of programming for the pri-
vate interest of the NFL.
CONCLUSION
The judicial and legislative history indicates that Congress did not
intend home game blackouts to remain outside the scope of antitrust
laws. NFL I91 addressed the outside game blackout. It found the
blackout to be reasonable in 1953: it would ensure home game ticket
sales and working capital to a fledgling industry. At that time the reve-
nue from gate receipts was the lifeline of a team. In addition, the court
reasoned that the decrease in competition between the home game and
outside game telecasts would be offset by the increase in overall League
competition. The financial strength received from ticket sales would
strengthen a club's performance and promote competition on the play-
ing field.
NFL HJ92 voided a pooled-television-rights contract between the
League and CBS, prompting Congress to enact section 1291 to exempt
such contracts from the antitrust laws. The section unintentionally im-
bues the League, however, with unreserved power to blackout any
game. The so-called blackout exemption of section 1292 is Congress's
remedy to section 1291. Section 1292 prohibits all blackouts and per-
mits the League to blackout only those games played within the home
territory of a team that is playing at home. This exception clause was
attached to section 1292 solely to preserve the outside game blackout
held to be reasonable in NFL J193
Thus, although the League relies on the exception clause for per-
mission to blackout home games, the home game blackout was not in-
tended to receive the protection of section 1292. Without the protection
of a statutory exemption and unless reasonable under the NFL 194
analysis, the home game blackout violates the antitrust laws. In 1980
the home game blackout is not a reasonable restraint of trade. The
89. Regulation of Radio Communication. Hearings on HR 7357 Before the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong. (1924).
90. See note 87 supra.
91. See note 5 supra.
92. See note 8 supra.
93. Id.
94. See note 5 supra.
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justification for the blackout in 1953 was based on the need to ensure
ticket sales for a fledgling enterprise. Today, the number of teams,
games played, stadium attendance, and price for television rights define
a national, billion-dollar enterprise business which neither requires nor
merits federal economic protection by means of the blackout exemp-
tion.
Ironically, the statute is not used today to blackout outside games,
the blackout that it was enacted to preserve. The blackout of games
soldout forty-eight hours before game-time has also been lifted. In the
past the NFL argued for the outside game and soldout game blackouts,
predicting a decrease in ticket sales, concession and parking revenue,
stadium rent to the municipality, and stadium attendance, should the
blackouts be lifted. These predictions remain unrealized, despite the
elimination of the outside game and soldout game blackouts. Identical
arguments have been made for continuing the home game blackout
within the home territory. Responding to these arguments, FCC and
independent studies confirm the results of the earlier blackout repeals:
telecasts of the games do not adversely affect ticket sales or stadium
attendance.
The construction of the statute, its resulting misapplication by the
League, and complications which will occur as cable-television enters
the market demand review of section 1292. Legislative repeal of the
blackout exemption is mandated. At the very least, amendment of defi-
nitions and administrative sections of the statute is necessary. Revision
of the statute must emphasize the purpose of the blackout exemption
and reconsider the statute's rationale in light of the NFL's economic
strength. The public interest, as stated in the Communications Act, de-
mands the widest possible dissemination of interstate telecasts.
Cori Jan Ching*
* B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1978; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1981.
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